Abstract. Practical approaches to constructing public key cryptosystems secure against chosen ciphertext attacks were rst initiated by Damgard and further extended by Zheng and Seberry. In this paper we rst point out that in some cryptosystems proposed by Zheng and Seberry the method for adding authentication capability may fail just under known plaintext attacks. Next, we present a new method for immunizing public key cryptosystems against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. In the proposed immunization method, the deciphering algorithm rst checks that the ciphertext is legitimate and then outputs the matching plaintext only when the check is successful. This is in contrast with the Zheng and Seberry's methods, where the deciphering algorithm rst recovers the plaintext and then outputs it only when the checking condition on it is satis ed. Such a ciphertext-based validity check will be particularly useful for an application to group-oriented cryptosystems, where almost all deciphering operations are performed by third parties, not by the actual receiver.
Introduction
Recently much attention has been devoted to constructing public key cryptosystems secure against chosen ciphertext attacks, from the theoretical and practical points of view. Theoretically, non-interactive zero-knowledge proof was shown to be a nice tool for this purpose 3] 9] and several such concrete public key cryptosystems have been proposed 16] 18]. However, due to the enormous data expansion during the enciphering transformation, the resulting schemes are highly ine cient and thus no one would try to implement them in practice.
Practical approaches to this eld were initiated by Damgard 7] and further extended by Zheng and Seberry 25] . The key idea of Damgard's approach is to construct a public key cryptosystem in such a way that an attacker cannot produce legitimate ciphertexts (i.e., the ciphertexts whose plaintexts he can get from the deciphering oracle) without knowing the plaintext. This makes useless the attacker's ability to gain access to the deciphering oracle under chosen ciphertext attacks. Based on this idea, Damgard 7] proposed simple methods for modifying any deterministic public key cryptosystems and the ElGamal/Di e-Hellman cryptosystem so that the resulting cryptosystems may be more secure under chosen ciphertext attacks. Later, by re ning Damgard's idea and combining the probabilistic encryption technique 10], Zheng and Seberry 25] presented three practical methods for immunizing public key cryptosystems and proved that their cryptosystems are semantically secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks under reasonable assumptions.
In this paper, we rst point out that in some cryptosystems presented by Zheng and Seberry the method for adding authentication capability may fail just under known plaintext attacks. Next we propose a new method for immunizing public key cryptosystems, which is illustrated by constructing cryptosystems based on the Di e-Hellman/ElGamal scheme and the RSA scheme. In the modi ed cryptosystems, the deciphering algorithm rst checks that ciphertexts are properly constructed according to the enciphering algorithm and only when the check is successful, does it output the matching plaintexts. A main di erence of our approach from that of Zheng and Seberry is that it is determined based on the ciphertext, not on the recovered plaintext, whether or not the deciphering algorithm outputs the result.
Such a ciphertext-based validity check is especially useful for an application to group-oriented cryptosystems 8]. In group-oriented cryptosystems, ciphertexts are usually accompanied by the indicator indicating the nature of the ciphertexts and all or substantial part of deciphering operations are performed independently of the actual receiver(s). Then the partial computations are distributed to the legitimate receiver(s) according to the indicator and the security policy of the receiving company. Thus, the main threat is an illegal modi cation of the indicator by an inside group member who violates the security policy and tries to read the ciphertexts. This requires a concrete scheme for combining the ciphertexts and the indicator so that no one can produce a legal ciphertext by modifying the intercepted ciphertext, especially by changing the indicator. The proposed cryptosystem is well suited for this application.
This rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie y mentions probabilistic encryption and pseudorandom number generators. Section 3 discusses the previous works of Damgard and Zheng-Seberry in this eld. Here, we also point out some weakness of Zheng and Seberry's method for adding authentication capability to their cryptosystems. In section 4, applying the proposed immunization method, we present two cryptosystems based on the Di e-Hellman/ElGamal scheme and the RSA scheme and analyze their security. Finally we conclude in section 5.
2 Random Number Gen. and Probabilistic Encryption Goldwasser and Micali 10] presented a general scheme for constructing public key probabilistic encryption schemes which hide all partial information, in the sense that whatever is e ciently computable about the plaintext given the ciphertext is also e ciently computable without the ciphertext. (This is an informal de nition of semantic security which can be thought of as a polynomially bounded version of Shannon's perfect secrecy. See 13] for other equivalent notions of security for public key cryptosystems.) These encryption schemes can be thought of as the best we are seeking for, as far as passive attacks are concerned, since a polynomially bounded passive attacker can extract no information on the plaintexts from the ciphertexts. They also gave a concrete implementation under the intractability assumption of deciding quadratic residuosity modulo a large composite number. However, their scheme expands each plaintext bit into a ciphertext block of length of the composite modulus and thus is highly ine cient.
Cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generators whose notion was rst introduced by Blum and Micali 5] and extended by Yao 24] is one of the most powerful tools in many cryptographic applications. The output sequences produced by such a generator cannot be distinguished by a polynomial-time algorithm from truly random sequences of the same length (such a generator is said to be perfect). Thus these generators can be used for constructing more e cient probabilistic encryption schemes, as rst illustrated by Blum and Goldwasser 4] : \Send the exclusive-or of a message sequence with an output sequence of the same length of a pseudorandom number generator, together with a public key encryption of a random seed used". Consequently, cryptosystems constructed like this can be proved to be secure against any passive attacks (e.g., see 4] for detailed proof) and thus as far as passive attacks are concerned, the problem of constructing a secure public key cryptosystem is settled. Furthermore, the plaintext is only expanded by a constant factor in this case, the portion of public key encryption of a random seed used.
Several A main drawback of probabilistic encryption schemes is that while being provably secure against any passive attacks, they can be completely broken under chosen ciphertext attacks. In a chosen ciphertext attack, an attacker can query the deciphering oracle with polynomially many ciphertexts, and use the information obtained from the answers to extract any useful information for the target ciphertext.
Recently, Damgard 7] made a rst step into the research of practical public key cryptosystems secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. His key idea is to modify a public key cryptosystem in such a way that an attacker cannot produce ciphertexts whose plaintexts he can get from the deciphering oracle unless he starts by rst choosing the plaintext. This nulli es the ability to have access to the deciphering oracle under chosen ciphertext attacks. Based on this idea, he presented two concrete examples of public key cryptosystems which appear to be secure against chosen ciphertext attacks, one using any deterministic public key cryptosystems and the other using the Di e-Hellman /ElGamal public key cryptosystem.
To get a better insight into the Damgard's approach, we brie y describe his second scheme based on the Di e-Hellman/ElGamal public key cryptosystem. Let a user A's secret key be a pair (x A1 ; x A2 ) of elements chosen at random over 1; p? 1] and the corresponding public key be a pair (y A1 ; NULL otherwise: Here, NULL is a special symbol used for meaning \no plaintext output".
The intuitive reason of the security against chosen ciphertext attacks is that given g and y A1 , it seems hard to generate a pair (g r mod p; y r A1 mod p), unless one starts by simply choosing r, which in turn implies that it is hard for an attacker to generate a legitimate ciphertext (on which the deciphering algorithm produces a non-null output), unless he already knows the plaintext. Therefore, this modi ed ElGamal cryptosystem will be secure against chosen ciphertext attacks, if we assume that the original ElGamal is secure against passive attacks and that there is no other way to produce ciphertexts than to rst choose r. This approach suggests a method of gaining more security against chosen ciphertext attacks : \Modify a public key cryptosystem in such a way that it is infeasible to generate a legitimate ciphertext without rst choosing the plaintext. Then the modi ed cryptosystem will be as secure under a chosen ciphertext attack as under a passive attack."
Here, we have to note that Damgard considered a restricted model for chosen ciphertext attacks, known as indi erently chosen ciphertext attacks (also called a lunchtime attack or a midnight attack), where an attacker has access to the deciphering oracle only before seeing the ciphertext he attempts to decrypt itself. This is a less satisfying model of attacks inherent in real-life applications of cryptosystems, as illustrated by Zheng and Seberry 25] . One of the most severe type of attack against a public key cryptosystem is an adaptively chosen ciphertext attack, where an attacker is allowed to have access to the deciphering algorithm even after seeing the target ciphertext. Note that, in an adaptively chosen ciphertext attack, an attacker can feed the deciphering algorithm with the ciphertexts correlated to the target ciphertext and obtain the matching plaintexts. Consequently, the Damgard's scheme described above can be completely broken under this model of attacks as follows : For a given ciphertext c = (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ), an attacker feeds the deciphering algorithm with the modi ed ciphertext c 0 = (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 0 3 ) where c 0 3 = c 3 r with a random message r. Then he will get a message m 0 = m r as an answer and thus can obtain the desired message m by computing m = m 0 r.
Zheng and Seberry's Extension
Zheng and Seberry 25] further extended and generalized the Damgard's approach in order to attain security against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. Extending Damgard's idea, they introduced the notion of sole-samplability, de ned informally as follows : The space induced by function f : D ! R is said to be sole-samplable if there is no other way to generate an element y in R than to rst choose an element x in D and then to evaluate the function at the point x. This notion is very similar to the assumption used by Damgard in proving the security of his modi ed ElGamal cryptosystem under chosen ciphertext attacks. However, according to this notion, for the enciphering transformation to be a sole-samplable function, the whole ciphertext should be hard to generate without knowing the plaintext. Note that the space induced by the enciphering algorithm of Damgard's modi ed ElGamal cryptosystem is not sole-samplable due to the last part c 3 of the ciphertext.
Using di erent techniques in order to approximate sole-samplability of the enciphering transformation, they presented three methods for immunizing public key cryptosystems against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. Thanks to the generation of ciphertexts in a sole-samplable way along with probabilistic encryption, they could attain semantic security of their cryptosystems against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks, under reasonable assumptions. More generally, they proved the following : \Assume that the space induced by the enciphering algorithm of a public key cryptosystem is sole-samplable. Then the cryptosystem is semantically secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks, if it is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attacks." This is a quite obvious consequence resulting from the sole-samplability assumption on the enciphering transformation.
The main point of Zheng and Seberry's immunization methods is to make the enciphering transformation into a sole-samplable function by appending to each ciphertext a tag computed as a function of the message to be enciphered, much as a manipulation detection code (MDC) under encipherment or a message authentication code (MAC) in clear is used for message authentication. Note that a MDC is computed solely as a function of the message and transmitted under encipherment, while a MAC is computed from the message using a secret key and transmitted in clear 11]. The three immunization methods proposed by Zheng and Seberry di er only in the ways of generating tags. That is, they applied three basic tools that can be used to realize message authentication : one-way hash functions, universal classes of hash functions 6] 23] and digital signature schemes. Among them, the method based on one-way hash function (the resulting cryptosystem is denoted by C owh ) is rst explained, since it is very simple, but most re ects the approach taken by them. Assume h hashes arbitrary input strings into t-bit output strings. In this method, the ciphertext for an n-bit message m consists of a pair (c 1 ; c 2 ), where c 2 is the exclusive-or of the (n + t)-bit concatenated message mjjh(m) with an (n + t)-bit output sequence of a pseudorandom number generator on a secret seed s and c 1 is a public key encryption of the seed s. In the decryption process, the deciphering algorithm rst recovers a message m 0 jjh(m) 0 from the ciphertext c 2 and outputs m 0 as the matching plaintext only when h(m 0 ) = h(m) 0 . Due to the involvement of a tag h(m), it is reasonable to assume that a polynomially bounded adaptively chosen ciphertext attacker cannot produce a ciphertext whose plaintext passes the check of the deciphering algorithm. This justi es the sole-samplability assumption and thus the ability to have access to the deciphering oracle gives no advantage to the attacker. Therefore, the cryptosystem is as secure under adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks as under chosen plaintext attacks. Now its semantic security against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks follows immediately from the fact that the cryptosystem can be proved to be semantically secure under chosen plaintext attacks as in the Blum and Goldwasser's scheme 4].
Next we describe in more details the cryptosystem C sig which is based on an adaptation of digital signature schemes, since it will be a basis of our proposed method. Let p be a large prime and let g be a generator of the multiplicative group GF(p) . A user A possesses a secret key x A 2 R 1; p?1] and the corresponding public key is computed as y A p g xA . Let G(n; s) be an n-bit output sequence produced on seed s by a pseudorandom number generator based on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms in nite Assuming that the hash function h produces output with almost uniform distribution, the ciphertext also leaks no partial information on the message m. Note that a tag is generated like a MDC in Cowh whereas in C sig it is generated much like a MAC. Also note that in all three methods of Zheng and Seberry the validity check is based on the recovered plaintexts. In section 4, we will present a new immunization method using a ciphertext-based validity check.
Problem of Zheng-Seberry's Authentication Method
Zheng and Seberry also presented the method for adding authentication capability to their cryptosystems. Here, we point out that in their cryptosystems Cowh and Cuhf (based on universal class of hash functions), their method may fail to provide this capability under known plaintext attacks. First note that authentication scheme fails when a user di erent from the sender can create a message which the receiver will accept as being originated from the sender and that its security may be independent of the security of the cryptosystem used for secrecy. The reason of authentication failure in these two schemes is that tags are computed just as a function of the message to be enciphered and/or a pseudorandom sequence used for encryption, both of which are available under known plaintext attacks. This makes it possible for an attacker to reuse a pseudorandom sequence obtained from a ciphertext-plaintext pair to encrypt and falsely authenticate his chosen message.
Let's rst consider the cryptosystem C owh in which the ciphertext for an n-bit message m consists of (c 1 ; c 2 ) where c 1 p g r ; c 2 = G(n + t; s) (mjjh(m)) and the secret seed s is computed by s p y r A . As suggested by Zheng and Seberry, authentication capability may be added to this cryptosystem by the sender B computing a seed s as s p y r+xB A where x B is the secret key of user B. But in this case an attacker knowing the plaintext m for this ciphertext (mounting known plaintext attacks, for example) can obtain the (n+t)-bit pseudorandom sequence G(n+t; s) by simply exclusive-oring mjjh(m) with c 2 (i.e., G(n + t; s) = c 2 (mjjh(m))). Then he will be able to generate a legal ciphertext for his chosen message m 0 of length n 0 n as (c 1 ; c 0 2 ) where c 0 2 = G(n 0 + t; s) (m 0 jjh(m 0 )). Here, the pseudorandom sequence G(n 0 + t; s) is just the rst (n 0 + t) bits of G(n + t; s). Clearly this ciphertext will be correctly deciphered and the receiver A will accept the plaintext m 0 as a valid message sent by user B. The same attack can be applied to the cryptosystem C uhf as well. To send an n-bit message m to user A using the cryptosystem C uhf , a user B generates the ciphertext c = (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ) as : c 1 p g r ; c 2 = h u (m), and c 3 = z m. Here, z denotes the rst n bits of a pseudorandom sequence G(n + k; s) of length (n + k) produced on seed s p y r A and u denotes the remaining k bits of G(n + k; s). The function h u denotes a hash function speci ed by a string u in a universal class of hash functions mapping n-bit input into t-bit Finally, consider possible countermeasures against the described attack. First note that tags are computed as a function of the message alone in C owh or as a function of the message and pseudorandom sequence in C uhf , while in C sig the random numbers used to generate a seed are also involved in generating a tag. Therefore, we can see that to defeat the attack, either a secret seed itself or random numbers used to compute a seed should also be involved in generating a tag. Simple countermeasure may be such that h(m) (resp. h u (m)) is replaced by h(sjjm) (resp. h u (sjjm)) where in C owh the secret seed s may be used as an initialization variable of the hash function h.
an attacker can query the deciphering algorithm with any ciphertexts, except for the target ciphertext to decipher. However, in some applications, the attacker may feed the target ciphertext itself into the deciphering oracle and directly obtain the corresponding plaintext. This is seemingly a meaningless attack, but such a case may arise in group-oriented cryptosystems 8].
In group-oriented cryptosystems, the name of the destined receiver (or an indicator denoting the nature of the ciphertext, according to which the receiving group processes the ciphertext and distributes the partial results so that the legitimate group member can read the message) is usually accompanied by the ciphertext and in particular all or substantial part of the deciphering operations are carried out apart from the actual receiver. This separation of deciphering process from the actual receiver may make inside attacks easy, unless the ciphertext and the receiver's name are inalterably combined. This is because anyone inside the group can intercept the ciphertext not directed to him and then can change the receiver's name into his, if necessary in collusion with an outside colleague. Then all partial computations for decryption will be sent to him and thus he can decipher it. In fact, this inside attack may be mounted independently of the security of cryptosystems used. Ordinary authentication or digital signature schemes do not help to prevent an illegal modi cation of the receiver's name, since the modi cation should be detected, before decryption, by third parties not knowing the message. All that is required is to adapt the cryptosystem in such a way that any change in ciphertexts including the receiver's name can be detected before decryption by any third parties.
Motivated by the case considered above, we present a ciphertext-based immunization method and illustrate it by examples of the Di e-Hellman /ElGamal scheme and the RSA scheme in the following two subsections. In the proposed schemes, any attempt to illegally modifying ciphertexts can be detected at the start of the deciphering process, which makes useless adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks.
Immunizing Di e-Hellman/ElGamal Cryptosystem
Let p be a large prime (say, 512 bits) such that t-bit prime q divides p ? 1 (for example, t = 160) and let be a generator of the unique subgroup GF(q) of the multiplicative group GF(p) . Let h be a one-way hash function hashing arbitrary input strings into t-bit output strings (for example, secure hash standard 20]). Denote by G(n; s) an n-bit output sequence produced on a secret random seed s by a cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator such as 12], 14] and 17]. As before, each user A possesses a secret key x A 2 R GF(q) and let y A p xA be the corresponding public key. Assume user B wants to send in secret an n-bit message m to user A. Then they can proceed as follows.
Enciphering Algorithm ( For e ciency reason, we applied the Schnorr's signature scheme 19], with a secret key chosen at random. If the pseudorandom number generator requires a generator g of GF(p) , such a g can be published in addition.
Security against chosen plaintext attacks : Since among the ciphertext the only message embedding part is c 2 = z m, we know that as far as it is computationally infeasible to compute the seed s from the ciphertext, no partial information on m will be released to a polynomial-time chosen plaintext attacker. First an algorithm for computing s p y r1 show that a polynomial-time attacker can extract no additional information on the plaintext, even if he is given the ability to have access to the deciphering algorithm under adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. Then, the proposed cryptosystem will be as secure under adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks as under chosen plaintext attacks.
First we note that, in order to obtain any useful information on the plaintext corresponding to the ciphertext c = (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ; c 4 ) from the accessibility to the deciphering oracle, an attacker must generate a ciphertext c 0 = (c 0 1 ; c 0 2 ; c 0 3 ; c 0 4 ) so that the following two conditions are satis ed at the same time : First, the ciphertext c 0 must satisfy the checking condition of step i) of the deciphering algorithm to get a non-null output. Second, the seed computed from the modi ed ciphertext by the deciphering algorithm must be equal to the seed used to produce the original ciphertext, since otherwise the output will be just another pseudorandom string indistinguishable from the truly random string. The second condition requires that no change in c 0 and c 1 should be made. Consequently, the attacker must solve the congruence equation c 0 p c4 c ?c3 In the above, we have shown that a polynomially bounded attacker gains no advantage from the accessibility to the deciphering oracle under adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks. This, together with semantic security under chosen plaintext attacks, shows that the proposed cryptosystem is semantically secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks, under the Di e-Hellman assumption.
The main di erence of our immunization method from that of Zheng and Seberry is that a signature is generated based on the ciphertext, not on the message m. Consequently, everyone can check that ciphertexts are properly constructed according to the enciphering algorithm. This property may be useful in many applications, as exempli ed by an application to group-oriented cryptosystems in subsection 4.1.
Adding authentication capability : Authentication capability is easily incorporated into the system : just replace (r 1 ; c 1 ) by the secret key/public key pair (x B ; y B ) of the sender (user B). In this case, the last two parts (c 3 ; c 4 ) of the ciphertext constitute a signature for the message embedding part c 2 of the ciphertext. Though the signature is generated on the ciphertext, not on the message m, generally considered as a bad practice for signing, it does not raise any problem as a signature for the message m (for example, the authorship problem raised in the CCITT X.509 token structure 15]). This is because message encryption and signature generation are tightly combined through the same random number r 0 , which ensures that no one can produce a signature for the ciphertext c2 without knowing the plaintext m.
Some additional cleartexts may be included as arguments of the hash function, e.g., the name of the sender and receiver, time information, and especially the indicator of the ciphertext when used for a group-oriented cryptosystem. As shown above, these cleartexts cannot be modi ed by an attacker. In particular, time information may be used to prevent the playback attack within the (predetermined) clock skew limit. We think that adding these additional cleartexts can provide much convenience in most communications, since the source and destination and the timeliness of a ciphertext can be easily veri ed by using only the ciphertext. 
Conclusion
This paper presented a new method for immunizing public key cryptosystems against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks, which is illustrated by examples of the Di eHellman/ElGamal cryptosystem and the RSA cryptosystem. In the proposed immunization method, everyone can check that ciphertexts are properly constructed according to the enciphering algorithm. This property is particularly useful for an application to group-oriented cryptosystems, where deciphering operations are separated from the actual receiver and the main threat is an illegal modi cation of the indicator by an inside group member. We also pointed out that in some of the cryptosystems presented by Zheng and Seberry the method for adding authentication capability may fail just under known plaintext attacks and presented a simple countermeasure.
